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On the Internet, Nobody Knows You are a Dog:
Contested Authorship of Digital Evidence in Cases of
Gender-based Violence
Suzie Dunn & Moira Aikenhead*

1. INTRODUCTION: HURDLES IN ESTABLISHING AUTHORSHIP OF
DIGITAL EVIDENCE
Social media and other forms of digital communication have become a rich
source of evidence in many modern-day trials.1 The ephemeral and dynamic
nature of digital evidence has raised novel evidentiary issues, and courts have
begun to navigate how digital forms of evidence can be used in criminal cases. 2
Lisa Silver has discussed how social media, text, and email-based evidence have
been appearing with increasing frequency in criminal cases, creating some
challenges when applying traditional rules of evidence.3 As evidentiary rules
about electronic documents develop, and existing rules of evidence are applied to
these documents, police, lawyers, and judges must familiarize themselves with
evolving rules and practices.4
As with other areas of criminal law, digital evidence is beginning to play an
increasingly significant role in gender-based violence (‘‘GBV”) cases. 5 New issues
are arising around how this evidence should be collected and treated by the
courts. Taking into consideration historical and ongoing barriers that
complainants in GBV trials have faced, this article applies a feminist, equalityfocused lens to identify existing and potential issues that the police,
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complainants, Crown counsel, defence counsel, and judges in GBV trials should
be alert to when dealing with digital evidence. Specifically, this article focuses on
challenges related to establishing authorship of digital evidence in GBV trails.
Questions of authorship may arise when there are existing text messages, social
media posts, or other digital content allegedly written by the accused or another
witness. In many cases, such evidence may be crucial in proving the identity of
the perpetrator, an essential element of every criminal offence. For example, a
complainant may have received Facebook messages in which the accused appears
to apologize for or admit to sexually assaulting them. In such a case, the Crown
must ensure these relevant electronic documents are admitted at trial and must
adduce evidence sufficient to establish the accused in fact wrote the messages.
There are various evidentiary hurdles that must be met to have the evidence
admitted, authenticated, and proven at trial.
There are numerous considerations justice system actors must take into
account in order to properly address the issue of authorship of digital evidence at
trial. In order to have relevant electronic documents admitted, and authorship of
those documents established, police may need to undertake additional
investigatory efforts to collect evidence that can assist in demonstrating
authorship. In the case of the Crown, certain evidentiary burdens must be met,
and complainants and other witnesses must be prepared by Crown counsel to
address the accuracy of any digital evidence associated with them during their
testimony. Defence counsel may contest the accuracy or reliability of digital
evidence tendered by the Crown, including putting forward theories about
alternative authors of the messages or asserting that the Crown has failed to
prove the accused wrote the messages.
In the following sections, we examine various aspects of digital evidence at
GBV trials, drawing on relevant Canadian criminal case law. First, we describe
some of the unique challenges related to electronic documents generally with
respect to determining authorship. Second, we review some of the historical and
ongoing practices within the criminal justice system that rely on harmful
gendered myths about GBV and note the potential for these myths to emerge in
relation to digital evidence. Third, we discuss the duty of investigating police
officers to gather the necessary available digital evidence to demonstrate
authorship and note potential gaps in current investigatory practices that could
negatively impact the trial outcome for victims of GBV. Fourth, we review some
of the evidentiary rules for admitting and authenticating digital evidence at trial,
discussing how these rules have been interpreted and applied in the GBV context.
Fifth, we examine what evidentiary burdens the Crown faces in proving
authorship at trial, highlighting the developing nature of law in this area. Finally,
we conclude with several recommendations for various justice system actors on
how to manage digital evidence in GBV cases where authorship may be
contested.
While the focus of this article is on examining and making recommendations
in relation to the use of digital evidence in GBV criminal trials, we recognize
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significant systemic problems with the criminal justice system that make it an
undesirable and unrealistic option for many victims of GBV.6 Victims are not
always believed by the police even when they have legitimate claims, 7 and many
ongoing practices within the adversarial trial process create additional trauma
for some GBV victims.8 It is well documented that many Indigenous and Black
individuals, people of colour, and members of the LGBTQ2s+ community have
experienced discrimination when engaging with the police and justice system, and
as such members of these groups may be particularly disinclined to rely on the
criminal justice system to address violence against them.9 In Canada, there is a
long history of the justice system ignoring reports of violence against Indigenous
women and girls, and in some cases police and other justice system actors have
directly perpetrated this violence, leaving deep-seated distrust in the criminal
justice system and a desire for alternative options for addressing GBV. 10 As a
result, many advocates and victims have been exploring alternative methods of
6
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See e.g. National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls,
Reclaiming Power and Place: The Final Report of the National Inquiry into Missing and
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Rights Watch, Those Who Take Us Away: Abusive Policing and Failures in Protection of
Indigenous Women and Girls in Northern British Columbia, Canada (New York: Human
Rights Watch, 2013); Sherene Razack, Looking White People in the Eye: Gender, Race
and Culture in the Courtrooms and Classrooms (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1999); Rebecca Rose, Before the Parade: A History of Halifax’s Gay, Lesbian, and
Bisexual Communities 1972-1984 (Halifax: Nimbus Publishing, 2019).
Robyn Doolittle, “Why Police Dismiss 1 in 5 Sexual Assault Claims as Baseless” The
Globe & Mail (3 February 2017), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/news/investigations/unfounded-sexual-assault-canada-main/article33891309/> [Doolittle, ‘‘Why Police Dismiss”]; National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and
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6; Human Rights Watch, supra note 6; Razack, supra note 6; Rose, supra note 6; Craig,
supra note 8; Jessica A Turchik, Claire L Hebenstreit & Stephanie S Judson, “An
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Neal, “Intimate Partner Violence Among Sexual Minority Populations: A Critical
Review of the Literature and Agenda for Future Research” (2015) 5:2 Psychology of
Violence 112; Dora M Y Tam et al, ‘‘Racial Minority Women and Criminal Justice
Responses to Domestic Violence” (2016) 31:4 J Family Violence 527; Natasha Bakht,
‘‘What’s in a Face? Demeanour Evidence in the Sexual Assault Context” in Elizabeth A
Sheehy, ed, Sexual Assault in Canada: Law, Legal Practice and Women’s Activism
(Ottawa: University of Ottawa, 2012) [Sheehy, ‘‘Sexual Assault”]; Lisa Dario et al,
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justice11 and calling for the transformation12 or even abolition of criminal justicebased systems.13 Many victims of GBV choose not to engage with the criminal
justice system, and others continue to face discriminatory systemic barriers in
accessing justice within that system. Within the context of these varied and valid
critiques, the recommendations in this paper are premised on the notion that, so
long as the criminal justice system remains the primary state-supported
mechanism for dealing with GBV, it must be accessible to all victims, all of
whom are entitled to investigatory and trial processes that are fair, treat them
with dignity, and do not rely on discriminatory beliefs.

(a) Hurdles in Establishing Authorship of Digital Evidence
Proving authorship of a digital message may be crucial to the Crown proving
its case against an accused. Establishing that it was the accused who authored a
particular digital message or engaged in an online conversation may be a
necessary component in establishing identity, which is an essential element of
every criminal offence. This may be particularly so in circumstances where the
offending behaviour occurred in a digital space, including certain cases of the
non-consensual distribution of intimate images, uttering threats, or sexual
exploitation.
One of the first evidentiary stages of a criminal trial is admitting evidence. 14
For evidence to be admissible it must be relevant to a material issue in the case,
must not be excluded by an exclusionary rule such as hearsay, and must not be
excluded through the judge’s exclusionary discretion. Wherever there is a
question as to whether a particular piece of evidence complies with these
requirements, a voir dire should be held to determine its admissibility. 15 The
standards of admissibility vary depending on the type of evidence and which
party is tendering the evidence. For example, real evidence must be relevant,
material, and authentic.16 Authenticity shows that the evidence is what it
11
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Nicola Henry, Asher Flynn, & Anastasia Powell, ‘‘The Promise and Paradox of Justice”
in Nicola Henry, Anastasia Powell, & Asher Flynn, eds, Rape Justice: Beyond the
Criminal Law (London: Palgrave McMillan, 2015) at 1.
Lise Gotell, ‘‘Reassessing the Place of Criminal Law Reform in the Struggle Against
Sexual Violence” in Henry, Powell & Flynn, supra note 11 at 53.
Moira Donegan, “’Who will Protect you from Rape Without Police?’ Here’s My Answer
to that Question” The Guardian (17 June 2020), online: <www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2020/jun/17/abolish-police-sexual-assault-violence>; Angela P Harris,
‘‘Heteropatriarchy Kills: Challenging Gender Violence in a Prison Nation” (2011) 37:13
Wash UJL & Pol’y 13; Kimberlé Crenshaw, ‘‘From Private Violence to Mass
Incarceration: Thinking Intersectionally About Women, Race, and Social Control”
(2012) 59 UCLA L Rev 1418.
David M Paciocco, Palma Paciocco & Lee Stuesser, eds, The Law of Evidence, 8th ed
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2020) at 33-62.
Paciocco, supra note 4; R. v. Ball, 2019 BCCA 32, 2019 CarswellBC 133 (B.C. C.A.) [Ball]
at para. 67.
Paciocco, Paciocco & Stuesser, supra note 14 at 59.
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purports to be.17 The party tendering the evidence, either the Crown or defence,
bears the burden of establishing authenticity. There are special rules of
authentication for electronic documents, which are governed by the Canada
Evidence Act (CEA), as will be discussed further below. Once threshold
admissibility is established, there may be additional hurdles to having the
evidence admitted, such as establishing that hearsay evidence falls under an
exception to the rule against hearsay. If evidence is ultimately admitted, the
weight that the trier of fact will give to that evidence remains a live issue for trial.
The standards for admitting evidence are different than the ultimate standards of
proof for the case, and the Crown still bears the burden of proving the guilt of
the accused beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence that was admitted.
Returning to the example of Facebook messages containing an apology for
an alleged sexual assault, the messages will be relevant if they assist in proving
that the author admitted to the offence and that the author is the accused, as this
is material to the issue of identity. If the Crown wishes to tender such evidence,
they bear the onus of establishing authenticity. Further, as such statements will
constitute hearsay if admitted for the truth of their contents, the Crown also
bears the burden of proving on a balance of probabilities that the messages fall
within an exception to the rule against hearsay. Assuming the evidence is
admitted, the Crown must still prove all elements of the offence, including
identity, beyond a reasonable doubt, which may include proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the accused authored the relevant messages.
Electronic documents create certain unique evidentiary challenges in relation
to admitting evidence and establishing authorship. While David Paciocco notes
that many existing rules of evidence may be applied in the same fashion to
electronic documents,18 authors such as Lisa Silver have noted that electronic
evidence lacks the stability, individuality, and access limitations of physical
documents such as handwritten letters, creating new challenges for this type of
evidence.19 While disputes as to authorship of evidence at criminal trials are not
new, they are occurring with increasing frequency given the societal pivot to
digital communications in recent years,20 and given certain features of digital
communications that make authorship a live issue in many cases.
Establishing that a particular individual authored a digital message may be a
difficult task for a variety of reasons. For one, it is not always apparent on the
face of a digital communication who authored the message. 21 In their discussion
17

18
19
20

R. v. Martin, 2021 NLCA 1, 2021 CarswellNfld 2 (N.L. C.A.) at para. 47 [Martin]; R. v.
C.B., 2019 ONCA 380, 2019 CarswellOnt 7222 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 66 [CB]; Paciocco,
Paciocco & Stuesser, supra note 14 at 59.
Paciocco, supra note 4.
Silver, supra note 1.
Fanny A Ramirez & Jeffrey Lane, “Communication Privacy Management and Digital
Evidence in an Intimate Partner Violence Case” (2019) Intl J Communication 5140,
online: <link.gale.com/apps/doc/A610340551/LitRC?u=ubcolumbia&sid=summon&xid=67ebe4d0>.
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of social media and the law, Steve Coughlan and Robert Currie note that an
individual’s identity is not always clear when using social media but, depending
on the type of social media used, there can be some ways to help identify them. 22
Certain social media platforms, such as Facebook, have ‘‘real name” policies,
requiring users to use ‘‘the name they go by in everyday life,”23 and others, such
as LinkedIn, are generally associated with people using their actual name on their
accounts.24 It is quite common for people to use their real names on these sites
and to post identifying information such as personal details and photographs
identifying them as the owner of the account. Further, they may have a long
history of communicating via these platforms, and such previous
communications may contain information relevant to establishing their
identity. On the other hand, ‘‘real name” policies are easy to circumvent and
are not stringently enforced.25 Many people use a pseudonym or a portion of
their real name on their social media accounts for privacy or other reasons. 26
Others use multiple accounts on the same social media platform. 27 Further, it is
relatively simple to create an account in someone else’s name on many social
media websites and to send messages that appear to be from that person. 28
Certain social media platforms, such as Reddit, are designed to encourage
anonymous or pseudonymous posting, which raises additional barriers to
establishing authorship of content found on these sites, as no identifiable author
will be associated with the name on a post or message.29 In cases involving digital
evidence from a website that encourages anonymity, such as Reddit, or from
other anonymous phone numbers, social media accounts, or e-mail addresses,
additional evidence may be necessary to link this evidence to a particular
individual, such as an associated IP address or telecommunications records. 30 To
21
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Aradhya Sethia, “Rethinking Admissibility of Electronic Evidence” (2016) 24:3 Intl JL
& IT 229.
Steve Coughlan & Robert J Currie, “Social Media: The Law Simply Stated” (2013) 11:2
CJLT 229.
Facebook, ‘‘What names are allowed on Facebook?” (2021), posted on Facebook Help
Center, online: Facebook <www.facebook.com/help/112146705538576>.
Coughlan & Currie, supra note 22.
Ibid.; Torill Elvira Mortensen, ‘‘Anger, Fear, and Games: The Long Event of
#GamerGate” (2016) 13:8 Games & Culture 787.
Cassie Cox, “Protecting Victims of Cyberstalking, Cyberharassment, and Online
Impersonation through Prosecutions and Effective Laws” (2014) 54:3 Jurimetrics 277.
Brooke Erin Duffy & Emily Hund, “Gendered Visibility on Social Media- Navigating
Instagram’s Authenticity Bind” (2019) 13 Intl J Communication 4983, online:
<link.gale.com/apps/doc/A610367795/LitRC?u=ubcolumbia&sid=summon&xid=b3ef65ca>.
Dan Grice & Bryan Schwartz, “Social Incrimination: How North American Courts are
Embracing Social Network Evidence in Criminal and Civil Trials” (2012) 36:1 Man LJ
221.
Ira P Robbins, “Writings on the Wall: The Need for an Authorship-Centric Approach to
the Authentication of Social: Networking Evidence” (2011) 13:1 Minn J L Sci & Tech 1.
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further complicate the issue, these types of messages can be sent from ‘‘spoofed”
accounts, through Tor, or through virtual private networks (VPNs), where the
message appears to be coming from a particular email, phone number, or IP
address but actually originated from another source.31 Considering all of these
factors, it can be a complex exercise to determine who wrote a particular digital
message and what evidence will be sufficient to prove authorship at trial.
Even where pseudonyms, fake accounts, spoofing, or digital manipulation is
not an issue and the evidence significantly supports an inference that a message
came from an account associated with a particular individual, the
interconnectivity of the internet and the accessibility of devices makes it
possible for people to access others’ accounts with or without their consent. 32
Research by Karen Levy and Bruce Schneier describes how common it is for
intimate partners or family members to share or learn one another’s passwords
and access one other’s accounts and devices.33 If a message is sent from a
computer or device to which multiple people have access, this can raise questions
about who in fact authored a message from an account accessible on that
computer or device.
These realities of digital communications may create difficulties at trial for
parties seeking to introduce and rely on potentially relevant digital evidence. 34 As
who actually wrote a digital message will not always be readily apparent, parties
seeking to tender and rely on such evidence may face evidentiary hurdles in
having that evidence admitted or in proving an individual was in fact the author
of the communication. Demonstrating or contesting the accuracy of digital
evidence may require additional investigatory efforts and evidence. 35 In cases in
which the Crown seeks to rely on incriminating digital evidence allegedly
authored by an accused as part of a case against them, the Crown bears the onus
of proving the accused authored the messages.36 Defence counsel may need to
30
31

32

33

34

35

Coughlan & Currie, supra note 22.
Gabriella Sneeringer, “Contact that Can Kill: Orders of Protection, Caller ID Spoofing
and Domestic Violence” (2015) 90:3 Chicago-Kent L Rev 1157; Cynthia Fraser et al,
“The New Age of Stalking: Technological Implications for Stalking” (2010) 61:4
Juvenile & Family Court J 39; II Savchenko & O Yu Gatsenko, ‘‘Analytical Review of
Methods of Providing Internet Anonymity” (2015) 49:8 Automatic Control & Computer
Sciences 696.
Ken Chasse, “Electronic Records for Evidence and Disclosure and Discovery” (2011) 57
CLQ 284.
Karen Levy & Bruce Schneier, “Privacy Threats in Intimate Relationships” (2020) 6:1 J
Cyber Security 1.
As noted by Bennett J in R. v. Hamzehali, 2017 BCCA 290, 2017 CarswellBC 2119 (B.C.
C.A.) at para. 64, leave to appeal refused R. v. M.H., 2018 CarswellBC 639, 2018
CarswellBC 640 (S.C.C.), ‘‘the advent of social media, e-mails and text messages has
made the prosecution and defence of charges far more complicated or cumbersome than
prior to these new technologies.”
Nathan Wiebe, “Regarding Digital Images: Determining Courtroom Admissibility
Standards” (2000) 28:1 Man LJ 61.
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tender evidence to challenge the integrity or reliability of evidence indicating
authorship.37 Taking into consideration the challenges listed above, Crown
counsel must gather evidence supporting a conclusion that the accused was in
fact the author.
The types of evidence that will be sufficient to establish authorship of digital
evidence at various stages of criminal legal proceedings and in various factual
circumstances is still developing. Our exploration of these issues forms the
subject of the remainder of this paper. While the nature of digital evidence itself
creates a number of evidentiary hurdles, other systemic issues raise particular
concerns in relation to establishing authorship in cases of GBV. In the following
section, we examine some of these concerns before exploring the current state of
the law regarding authorship of digital evidence in cases of GBV from the
investigatory to the trial stage of criminal proceedings.

(b) Contested Authorship in the Gender-Based Violence Context
In the past decade, digital evidence has come to be frequently relied on in
cases of GBV.38 It is widely understood that cases involving GBV, particularly
sexual assault, are some of the most challenging cases within the criminal justice
system.39 These cases are frequently characterized as ‘‘he-said-she-said,” as the
accused and complainant are often the only witnesses to the incident in question,
and there may be no additional evidence corroborating a complainant’s version
of events.40 As such, the credibility of the complainant will often be a central
36
37
38

39

40

R. v. Harris, 2010 PESC 32, 2010 CarswellPEI 43 (P.E.I. S.C.) [Harris].
Canada Evidence Act, RSC 1985, c C-5 , ss 31.1 & 31.3 [CEA].
Dodge et al, supra note 5; Anastasia Powell, Gregory Stratton & Robin Cameron,
‘‘Liminal Images: Criminality, Victimisation and Voyeurism” in Anastasia Powell,
Gregory Stratton & Robin Cameron, eds, Digital Criminology: Crime and Justice in
Digital Society (New York: Routledge, 2018); Anastasia Powell, ‘‘Configuring Consent:
Emerging Technologies, Unauthorized Sexual Images and Sexual Assault” (2010) 43
Austl & NZ J Crim 76.
Susan Ehrlich, ‘‘Perpetuating — and Resisting — Rape Myths in Trial Discourse” in
Elizabeth A Sheehy, ed, Sexual Assault in Canada: Law, Legal Practice and Women’s
Activism (Ottawa: University of Ottawa, 2012) [Sheehy, ‘‘Sexual Assault”]; Linda Baker,
Marcie Campbell & Anna-Lee Straatman, Overcoming Barriers and Enhancing
Supportive Responses: The Research on Sexual Violence Against Women (London,
ON: Centre for Research & Education on Violence Against Women & Children, Western
University, 2012); Melissa Lindsay, A Survey of Survivors of Sexual Violence in Three
Canadian Cities (Ottawa: Department of Justice Canada, 2014); Haley Clark, ‘‘A Fair
Way to Go: Justice for Victim-Survivors of Sexual Violence” in Henry, Powell & Flynn,
supra note 11; Margaret Denike, ‘‘Sexual Violence and ‘Fundamental Justice’: On the
Failure of Equality Reforms to Criminal Proceedings” (2000) 20:3 Can Woman Studies
151; Elaine Craig, ‘‘The Inhospitable Court” (2016) 66:2 UTLJ 197.
Christine Boyle, ‘‘Reasonable Doubt in Credibility Contests: Sexual Assault and Sexual
Equality” (2009) 13:4 IJEP 269; Jennifer Koshan, ‘‘The Judicial Treatment of Marital
Rape in Canada: A Post-Criminalisation Case Study” in Melanie Randall, Jennifer
Koshan & Patricia Nyaundi, eds, The Right to Say No: Marital Rape and Law Reform in
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issue at trial. Historically, intrusive and harmful cross-examination by some
defence counsel on issues such as a complainant’s sexual history resulted in
complainants facing such extensive scrutiny that they were essentially the ones
‘‘on trial” in these cases.41 Many complainants find it difficult to participate in
these trials, as they are expected to recount what was a personal and traumatizing
experience in intimate detail and, due to the adversarial nature of our legal
system, face rigorous questioning by defence counsel. 42 This can be an
emotionally fraught experience for these witnesses, some of whom experience
secondary trauma due to their involvement with the justice system. 43 The
frustration and emotional harms many complainants experience are in part due
to the highly personal and intimate aspects of the investigation and trial, but they
can be compounded by failures in the justice system surrounding evidence
collection, witness preparation, and the treatment of the witness while on the
stand, particularly when these failures are linked to systemic discrimination
against victims of GBV.44
As digital evidence is being increasingly relied on in cases of GBV, some
authors have noted the potential for this evidence to provide corroboration of
victims’ versions of events in the context of ‘‘he-said-she-said” criminal cases
involving sexual assault and other forms of GBV.45 Violence and the resulting
harms could be recorded or photographed, threats and harassing messages could
be saved and tendered as evidence, and admissions of guilt could be captured via
recordings or screenshots, showing that what victims were claiming was true. 46
However, while digital evidence has proven useful in many GBV cases, it is not a
panacea and comes with a series of complexities at trial. Digital evidence must
still be interpreted by judges and jurors, inevitably through the lens of their own
experiences and biases.47 Factors that impact the interpretive lens may include a
lack of knowledge about modern technology or about the unique evidentiary

41

42

43
44
45

46
47

Canada, Ghana, Kenya and Malawi (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2017) 139 [Koshan,
‘‘Judicial Treatment”].
See R. v. Goldfinch, 2019 SCC 38, 2019 CarswellAlta 1285, 2019 CarswellAlta 1286
(S.C.C.) at para. 33; R. v. R.V., 2019 SCC 41, 2019 CarswellOnt 12413, 2019 CarswellOnt
12414 (S.C.C.) at para. 33.
Elizabeth Sheehy, “Evidence Law and Credibility Testing of Women: A Comment on the
E Case” (2002) 2:2 Queensland U Technology L & Justice J 157 [Sheehy, ‘‘Credibility
Testing”]; R. v. G.F., 2021 SCC 20, 2021 CarswellOnt 6892, 2021 CarswellOnt 6893
(S.C.C.); Craig, ‘‘Trials on Trial”, supra note 8; Ehrlich, supra note 39.
Craig, ‘‘Trials on Trial”, supra note 8.
Ibid.
See Dodge, ‘‘Digital Witness”, supra note 1; Dodge et al, supra note 5; Crystal Garcia,
“Digital Photographic Evidence and the Adjudication of Domestic Violence Cases”
(2003) 31:1 J Crim Justice 579; Powell, Stratton & Cameron, supra note 38.
Dodge, ‘‘Digital Witness”, supra note 1.
Heather R Hlavka & Sameena Mulla, ‘‘‘That’s How She Talks’: Animating Text
Message Evidence in the Sexual Assault Trial” (2018) 52:2 Law & Soc’y Rev 401; Dodge,
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standards that apply in relation to electronic documents.48 Further, just as digital
evidence can be used to assist the Crown in proving alleged offences committed
against the complainant, digital evidence can be used to challenge the credibility
and consistency of a complainant’s evidence.49 Crown counsel play a key role in
ensuring a fair trial process, which includes preparing complainants for trial.
However, as Elaine Craig notes in the context of sexual assault cases, many
complainants are ‘‘woefully unprepared” for the trial process. 50 Crown counsel
must prepare complainants to testify as to the accuracy of the digital evidence
they tender at trial, including potentially explaining how the technology works or
why they believe the accused is the author. In some cases, complainants will need
to address accusations that they falsified information contained in the digital
messages, or authored the messages themselves to set up the accused.
Defence theories that a complainant fabricated or manipulated digital
evidence may prove particularly harmful in cases of GBV. Myths that women
frequently lie about GBV remain prevalent within the legal system despite
substantial feminist effort to combat these gendered stereotypes and research
demonstrating that crimes like sexual assaults are significantly under-reported,
and that false reports are relatively rare.51 Historically, evidentiary rules allowed
for the reinforcement of ideas that women frequently lied about sexual assault, 52
and that sexually active women were less worthy of belief.53 Women’s sexual

48
49

50
51

52
53

‘‘Digital Witness”, supra note 1; Alexa Dodge, ‘‘Digitizing Rape Culture: Online Sexual
Violence and the Power of the Digital Photograph” (2016) 12:1 Crime Media Culture 65.
Paciocco, supra note 4.
See e.g. R. v. Ghomeshi, 2016 ONCJ 155, 2016 CarswellOnt 4246 (Ont. C.J.); R. v. H.S.S.,
2021 BCPC 90, 2021 CarswellBC 1118 (B.C. Prov. Ct.); R. v. Jesso, 2020 CarswellNfld 9
(N.L. Prov. Ct.).
Craig, ‘‘Trials on Trial”, supra note 8 at 152.
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history and psychological background were used to undermine complainants’
credibility at trial.54 Efforts have been made to dispel rape myths from the
criminal justice system, including limiting the use of sexual history and
counselling records as evidence in cases of sexual assault.55 Nevertheless, as
demonstrated through Craig’s research, harmful, sexist ideas about women
continue to be relied on by certain defence counsel and other justice system
actors, and these stereotypes cause unnecessary distress to many victims who
have to respond to them on the stand.56 These burdens are disproportionately
borne by Indigenous women who are frequently targeted for sexual violence 57
and and who must confront systemic gendered racial discrimination.58
Reliance on sexist stereotypes in the legal system are not limited to sexual
assault trials. In the domestic violence context, some defendants may attempt to
undermine their credibility by characterizing their claims as fabricated, the idea
being that complainants could be lying in order to gain an advantage in custody
proceedings or punish their partners as a form of vengeance. 59 These issues make
GBV trials notoriously demanding for complainants, and the criminal justice
system has been widely critiqued for the systemic challenges victims face in
seeking justice for the gender-based crimes committed against them.60
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The unique features of digital communications that make electronic
messages vulnerable to manipulation and fabrication discussed in the first
section of this paper, and the legacy of sexist myths that women frequently invent
claims of sexual assault and intimate partner violence, combine to make digital
evidence ripe territory for arguments by defence counsel that complainants
authored or manipulated messages ostensibly sent by the accused. While in many
cases alternative defence theories regarding authorship may be legitimate, there is
a risk that baseless and speculative challenges to digital evidence in cases of GBV
may improperly rely on sexist myths regarding false accusations and fabrication.
In this way, digital evidence may become another area where victims of GBV
must face unsubstantiated and harmful challenges to their experiences, which can
be a distressing and re-traumatizing experience for many.
As noted in the previous section, demonstrating who authored relevant
digital evidence may not be a straightforward process. As will be explored further
throughout this paper, it is not uncommon for defence counsel to challenge the
legitimacy of digital evidence or suggest someone else may have authored the
messages in cases of GBV. Defence counsel may raise the possibility that
someone else could have gained access to the accused’s accounts or devices,61 or
they may suggest the victims themselves could have authored the messages to
frame the accused or get revenge upon them.62 In the remainder of the paper, we
explore how authorship of digital evidence is being established and challenged in
the GBV case law, from the investigatory to the trial stage. The cases discussed in
the following sections represent a sample of recent Canadian criminal cases
involving allegations of GBV in which concerns over the authorship of digital
evidence were discussed. This is by no means a comprehensive sample of all cases
meeting these criteria; rather, we selected these cases to demonstrate the varying
approaches taken by judges in this developing area of law.

(c) Digital Evidence & Police Investigations of Gender-Based Violence
As sexual assault, intimate partner violence, and other forms of GBV
frequently produce no or limited physical evidence, whatever evidence is
available in these cases holds particular value. After reporting a complaint to
the police, victims have relatively little influence on the manner in which police
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investigations and trials proceed, apart from providing evidence and testimony. 63
Victims rely on the police to determine if and how their complaints will be
investigated.64 Because digital evidence is easily deleted, accounts can be blocked,
and digital devices are often lost or damaged,65 it is critical that investigations
involving digital evidence be managed swiftly and efficiently. As digital evidence
becomes more prevalent in these cases, victims rely on police to ensure that such
evidence is properly extracted, collected, and preserved. In some cases, the
collection of digital evidence may be something that can only be undertaken with
police assistance, such as requests to social media companies to access personal
information associated with an account, or to fulfil a Norwich order to disclose
the identity associated with an IP address from an internet service provider. 66
While victims of GBV depend on police to conduct thorough investigations
into their complaints, their faith that police will do so may be justifiably limited.
Systemic bias in policing67 has led to many cases of sexual violence being
improperly labelled as unfounded, or being inadequately investigated.68 Beliefs
that women lie about sexual violence committed against them are deeply rooted
in our society and the criminal justice system, and such beliefs have resulted in
police taking limited investigatory steps when women report these crimes, and in
legitimate complainants being dismissed altogether.69 In her ground-breaking
investigative journalism for the Globe and Mail in 2017, Robyn Doolittle found
that one in every five sexual assault allegations in Canada is dismissed as baseless
(and thus unfounded) by police officers, a rate significantly higher than most
other crimes and one that does not match the statistics of false claims of sexual
63
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violence.70 Many police forces also have significant internal gender equity issues,
as evidenced by recent class actions against the RCMP regarding the
organization’s failure to address allegations of sexual harassment and
discrimination within the police force.71 In cases involving digital evidence, if
evidence is not collected in a timely manner, there is a significant risk that the
evidence may not be available at all or will have been altered if collected at a date
further into the future. If a case is unfairly classified as unfounded or not
properly investigated due to sexist beliefs, digital evidence could be lost even if
the case is later reopened or investigated at a later date.
When working with the police to collect digital evidence, victims face
numerous challenges that can impact the results of the trial. Digital evidence can
be difficult to preserve and capture. Social media platforms are not static, and
relevant content may be deleted, altered, or unavailable in its original form by the
time of the trial.72 Victims may delete text threads, lose or break their devices, or
get blocked from another user’s account before realizing they needed to collect
certain evidence they had not previously documented. Failing to collect relevant
evidence early on can greatly impact the likelihood of their case being proven at
trial if additional evidence such as the relevant conversation history, IP address,
or other information linking the accused to an account has not been collected
and is no longer available.
Presently, police forces are struggling to keep up with the new challenges
posed by digital evidence in their investigations of GBV. 73 The influx of this
evidence has created a demanding transition for police forces who are expected to
stay on top of new and evolving investigatory techniques.74 Alexa Dodge, Dale
Spencer, Rose Ricciardelli, and Dale Ballucci report that digital evidence is now
relied on in many, if not the majority, of sexual assault cases.75 Their research
shows that digital evidence can provide opportunities to help prove cases of
GBV, but it also adds additional work for investigating officers, who need to
know what digital evidence to collect and how to properly collect it. The large
volume of evidence typically involved in digital evidence investigations and the
70
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novel investigatory skills required to adequately investigate this type of evidence
mean that these investigations often require significant time and effort. The
relevant investigatory skills are reportedly less common among average police
officers, as there are limited officers with sufficient expertise on digital evidence
collection practices.76 The quantity of digital evidence also increases the amount
of time police must spend on a case collecting evidence from digital devices,
social media companies, and telecommunications providers. The officers
interviewed by Dodge et al described ‘‘a need for new or modified forms of
policing that respond to the influx of digital evidence.”77
Even in circumstances where complainants’ claims are swiftly investigated,
and where police departments are equipped to handle the collection of digital
evidence, there is currently a lack of clarity about what digital evidence must be
collected and tendered at trial. Indeed, this uncertainty was evident in some of
the GBV decisions we reviewed, as Facebook messages were ruled inadmissible
in part because no investigation was undertaken by police to determine the
account from which they were secured, and clear copies of the evidence were not
made.78 Judges were left with reasonable doubt as to the authorship of digital
evidence due to police failures to search or properly extract data from relevant
digital devices.79 This risks creating unfairness for victims, who may have their
digital evidence excluded or accorded little weight through no fault of their own.
Whatever digital evidence, including evidence of authorship, the police are
able to collect, this evidence must be properly tendered by Crown counsel at trial
and admitted by a judge and interpreted by the trier of fact. Further, the
reliability of this evidence may be challenged by defence counsel, who may assert
the Crown has not proven that the accused authored the relevant messages. In
the following sections, we explore the approach being taken by criminal courts in
Canada to authorship disputes in relation to threshold admissibility,
admissibility as hearsay, and at trial in cases of GBV.

(d) Admissibility of Digital Evidence in the Gender-Based Violence Case
Law
(i) Admissibility Under the Canada Evidence Act
The earliest stage at which authorship of digital messages was contested in
the cases we reviewed was in relation to threshold admissibility. The admissibility
of electronic evidence at trial is governed by the CEA, sections 31.3-31.8.80
Despite the applicability of the CEA to all electronic documents, lawyers and
judges do not always explicitly consider or apply this legislation in cases where
76
77
78
79

80
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parties seek to admit digital evidence.81 This has resulted in inconsistency in the
application of admissibility standards for social media evidence. 82 Judges in some
of the cases we examined criticized counsel’s failure to refer to CEA provisions
when making submissions regarding electronic document admissibility.83 Indeed,
in a number of cases it appears trial judges themselves may have been unaware of
the applicability of these provisions, as the CEA requirements were only
discussed on appeal.84
Pursuant to the CEA, ‘‘electronic documents,” which can include emails, 85
text messages,86 social media content,87 and audio-visual material88 must meet
the tests of authenticity and the best evidence rule in order to be admissible at
trial. As per section 31.1 of the CEA, the party tendering the document must
prove its authenticity ‘‘by evidence capable of supporting a finding that the
electronic document is that which it is purported to be”89 Authentication
requires ‘‘convincing a court that a thing matches the claim made about it” and is
connected to the evidence’s relevance.90 As noted by Graham Underwood and
Jonathan Penner, proof of authenticity and reliability is not concerned with the
substantive content of an electronic document, but where the document ‘‘comes
from, how it was obtained and handled, whether it can be trusted to be what it
purports to be, and how reliable a source of information it is about a material
issue.”91
The threshold for establishing authenticity of an electronic document under
the CEA is low,92 requiring only ‘‘some evidence that is logically probative of
whether the electronic document is what it purports to be.”93 This evidence may
81
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be direct or circumstantial.94 Evidence can be authenticated even where the
Crown and defence positions differ as to whether it is genuine or not.95 As noted
by the Court in Hirsch, the ‘‘integrity (or reliability) of the electronic document is
not open to attack at the authentication stage of the inquiry.”96
Authentication under the CEA, as at common law, requires consideration of
the purpose for which the evidence is being presented. 97 In some earlier cases, the
CEA’s authentication requirement was interpreted as requiring proof of
authorship — if the Crown’s theory was that messages originated from the
accused, what must be authenticated is ‘‘an evidentiary foundation upon which it
could be reasonably inferred that the messages were sent” by the accused. 98
However, recent appellate jurisprudence indicates that proof of authorship will
not be required to authenticate electronic documents.99 While demonstrating
authorship, something that will assist in assessing ultimate guilt or innocence,
will be sufficient to establish authenticity, establishing authenticity will not
necessarily be sufficient to establish authorship.100 As the Newfoundland and
Labrador Court of Appeal recently noted in R. v. Martin, concerns over
authorship ‘‘might impact other evidentiary principles, such as the relevance,
reliability and ultimate weight to be afforded to the evidence” but do not impact
the applicability of the relevant admissibility considerations. 101 In CB, the
Ontario Court of Appeal found that it is reasonable to infer at the authentication
stage that a sender has authored a message sent from their number, even if there
were an air of reality to a claim that this may not be so, as the low threshold for
admissibility ‘‘would seem to assign such a prospect to an assessment of
weight.”102 In that case, authenticity was established by virtue of the
complainant acknowledging certain text messages were sent and received by
her cell phone number.103
Circumstantial evidence was frequently sufficient to establish authenticity in
the GBV case law we examined. This was true even in those cases where
authenticity and authorship appeared to be conflated.104 Relevant evidence relied
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on to establish authenticity in the GBV case law included complainant testimony
that they recognize and can identify the electronic document, 105 testimony of the
complainant or another witness about how the document was created, 106
evidence the complainant received previous communications from the contested
account,107 the messages or posts appearing to be from an account associated
with the accused’s name,108 a reply to a message from the complainant,109
consistency between the contents of the messages and the relevant events
occurring at that time,110 and consistency between the messages and how the
accused communicates in person or on other platforms. 111 While expert
testimony can bolster claims of authenticity, it is not necessary to meet the low
threshold under the CEA.112
For the second step under the CEA admissibility requirements, the party
seeking to admit the electronic document must prove that it satisfies the ‘‘best
evidence” rule.113 This rule is intended to ensure an electronic document
accurately reflects the original information input into a digital device by the
author.114 Parties can satisfy the best evidence rule under the CEA by proving the
integrity of the relevant electronic documents system on a balance of
probabilities115 or through reliance on a rebuttable statutory presumption of
integrity under the CEA.116 As Lisa Dufraimont notes in her case commentary
on Martin, the presumption of system integrity may be relied on, in the absence
of evidence to the contrary, wherever the electronic document is legible and
coherent.117 Witness testimony about the functioning of a device and coherent,
104
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contextually consistent conversations involving that device at the relevant time
can constitute evidence capable of supporting a finding that a device was
working properly at all material times.118 In R. v. Moon, for example, the best
evidence rule was satisfied when the complainant testified that the phone on
which she received messages was working normally, she had purchased the phone
herself, and she had received the messages in question in the normal fashion as
she usually did.119 If a novel program is used or if a presumption is disputed,
evidence beyond the testimony of the complainant, such as an affidavit or
testimony from the technology company itself, may be required to explain how
the technology works.120 If there is any doubt that the program being used to
capture the digital evidence is not a well-known program, the Crown will want to
consider what evidence will be needed to explain the functionality of the
technology beyond the basic knowledge of the complainant.
The Supreme Court of Canada in Martin recently characterized the
admissibility requirements under the CEA as serving as a ‘‘generous gateway
for a common form of communication in our current society” while also serving
to ‘‘provide some degree of quality control.”121 As noted by Dufraimont, the low
threshold for admissibility under the CEA means that trial judges are safer to err
on the side of admission, and leave the resolution of any doubts regarding the
content of electronic evidence to an assessment of weight at the end of trial. 122
This may be true even if there is evidence providing an air of reality to claims of
tampering or impersonation in relation to the document.123 Thus claims by
defence counsel that someone else could have authored an electronic document
will generally be insufficient to prevent threshold authentication under the CEA.
Those arguments are to be addressed at a later stage in the admissibility process
or at trial by the triers of fact in determining weight.124
Dufraimont notes that the CEA authentication and best evidence
requirements will seemingly be met ‘‘whenever police receive from an
anonymous source a coherent document that looks like a Facebook post
labelled with the accused’s name and/or photo.”125 Some have argued that the
threshold for admissibility under the CEA has been interpreted as being so low
117
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that in order to preserve trial fairness, it may need to be adjusted or buttressed by
other factors, such as through the engagement of the trier of fact’s gatekeeping
function. Judges have the discretion to exclude technically relevant evidence
where the prejudicial effect of a piece of evidence outweighs its probative
value.126 Silver argues that, to ensure trial fairness, there should be stronger
considerations regarding the accuracy of digital evidence at the authentication
stage and a more robust use of the trier of fact’s discretionary gatekeeper role
when deciding whether to include or exclude digital evidence. 127 Her concerns
stem from the fact that social media is dynamic and can be manipulated in ways
that are different from other forms of evidence. Engaging the gatekeeper
function of the judge to address reliability issues and balance the potential
prejudicial effect of admission with the evidence’s probative value could help
mitigate any concerns about admitting questionable electronic evidence.
Ultimately, recent appellate jurisprudence appears to indicate that
authorship and authentication are distinct issues, and that the CEA’s
authentication and best evidence requirements represent a very low bar to
admissibility. That being said, the conflation of authorship and authenticity in
many cases makes it difficult to predict what types of digital evidence will be
admitted in a given trial setting. Indeed, the recent Ontario Court of Appeal
decision R. v. Aslami,128 discussed further below, indicates that expert evidence
regarding the functionality of digital messaging applications will be necessary in
some cases, but it does not explicitly state whether such evidence is necessary for
threshold admissibility, proof of identity, or both. As the standard for
admissibility under the CEA appears to be contested and developing, Crown
counsel should not assume that a copy of a digital message and the complainant’s
testimony that they received it on a functioning digital device will always be
sufficient to have that evidence admitted.
Once the CEA requirements of authenticity and the best evidence rule are
met, ultimate admissibility still requires that a document be legally relevant
(involving a consideration of the purpose for which the evidence is being
tendered) and consideration of any related general evidence rules. 129 Once a
document is admitted, the final determination of authorship and the weight given
to digital evidence will be determined by the trier of fact. The next two sections
outline the approach being taken by criminal courts to authorship in relation to
having electronic documents admitted as exceptions to the rule against hearsay,
and to establishing identity at trial.
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(ii) Admissibility as Hearsay
When an electronic document meets the requirements of authenticity and the
best evidence rule under the CEA, this means that this evidence may be admitted,
not that it will ultimately be admitted.130 As discussed by Nader Hasan, it is
important to remember that authenticity does not equal admissibility. 131
Standard evidentiary rules still apply, and the contents of the document may
raise admissibility issues.132 Courts must consider the application of exclusionary
rules and any relevant exceptions to those rules, as well as the exercise of the
judge’s exclusionary discretion.133
In the cases we examined, questions of admissibility frequently arose in
relation to digital evidence that purportedly included statements by the accused,
as such out-of-court statements constitute hearsay if the messages are being
admitted for the truth of their contents. 134 While hearsay evidence is
presumptively inadmissible, it may be admitted if it falls within a traditional
exception to hearsay.135 An accused’s digital communications can be admitted
pursuant to the ‘‘admission exception” to the rule against hearsay if the Crown
can prove on a balance of probabilities that the accused authored the message. 136
Additionally, it can be admitted pursuant to the ‘‘principled approach,” provided
it meets the requirements of necessity and reliability. 137
In order to be admissible as an exception to the rule against hearsay, the
Crown must establish on a balance of probabilities that the statement is
attributable to the accused. The balance of probabilities standard can be met in
relation to authorship on evidence such as ‘‘the source of the information, access
to the relevant email or social media address, the disclosure of details known to
the purported author, and the nature of the exchanges between the parties,
particularly where the exchanges relate to matters shared between the parties.”
138
As with evidence admitted pursuant to the CEA, once the admission is
accepted as evidence, the trier of fact must still determine whether the Crown has
130
131
132
133
134

135
136

137

138

Hasan, supra note 115; Paciocco, supra note 4 at 193.
Hasan, supra note 115.
SH, supra note 118.
Paciocco, supra note 4 at 219-220; Paciocco, Paciocco & Stuesser, supra note 14 at 47-53.
Paciocco, Paciocco & Stuesser, supra note 14 at 135. There is some debate about whether
admissions are an exception to the hearsay rule, or are simply admissible evidence
because the accused is available to be a witness at the trial and has the opportunity to take
the stand to contest this evidence (See Durocher, supra note 84 at para 63-64).
Paciocco, Paciocco & Stuesser, supra note 14 at 151-232.
R. v. Evans, 1993 CarswellAlta 111, 1993 CarswellAlta 567, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 653 (S.C.C.)
at para. 32; Paciocco, Paciocco & Stuesser, ibid. at 193.
R. v. Khan, 1990 CarswellOnt 108, 1990 CarswellOnt 1001, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 531 (S.C.C.);
R. v. Starr, 2000 SCC 40, 2000 CarswellMan 449, 2000 CarswellMan 450 (S.C.C.) [Starr];
R. v. Khelawon, 2006 SCC 57, 2006 CarswellOnt 7825, 2006 CarswellOnt 7826 (S.C.C.);
Paciocco, Paciocco & Stuesser, supra note 14 at 151-173.
JV, supra note 115 at para 3

392 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY

[19 C.J.L.T.]

proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, which may include a determination that
the accused did in fact author the admissions.139
In four sexual assault cases we examined, the Crown sought to admit
electronic conversations between the accused and the complainant as evidence
containing admissions by the accused.140 In these cases, the Crown was able to
establish on a balance of probabilities that the accused authored the messages,
and evidence related to the content of the messages and the history of
communication between the accused and the complainant was useful in proving
authorship. Information linking the phone number to the accused was also
helpful in two of these cases.141
In R. c. Soh, the contested messages were allegedly exchanged between the
complainant and the accused on Facebook, and the defence highlighted that the
Crown had not led any evidence from Facebook regarding the details of the
account, such as the username or IP address, or linked any such information to
the accused.142 The judge noted that while the IP address linking a Facebook
page to a particular individual would have be useful evidence, obtaining that
information would require an order that the provider disclose this information,
which is not absolutely necessary to prove the user’s identity in every case. 143 In
Soh, circumstantial evidence, including the accused’s use of a nickname that only
he called the complainant and discussions of details of the alleged sexual assault
only he could know, were sufficient to establish authorship on a balance of
probabilities in order for the evidence to be admitted as an exception to the rule
against hearsay.
In Moon, the complainant and accused also knew each other personally and
had a long history of text and phone communication through the telephone
number associated with the alleged admissions. Despite the defence arguing the
accused’s wife could have authored the messages because she also had access to
his phone, the timing and details of the texts led the judge to conclude on a
balance of probabilities that the accused authored the texts about the alleged
sexual assault.144 Likewise in R. v. Phagura, a record of ongoing communication
between the accused and complainant on WhatsApp helped associate the
admissions with the accused.145 In that case, the only evidence relied on by the
judge in determining the accused was the author of the messages was the fact that
the complainant identified the messages as coming from WhatsApp, where she
139
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had saved the accused as a contact, and subsequently received messages from
that contact.146
In R. v. MacDonald, the defence suggested that incriminating Facebook
messages could have been sent to the 15-year-old complainant by another
individual impersonating the accused; however, the judge found it was
speculative to suggest another person would gain unauthorized access to the
accused’s account days after the event to apologize and inquire about further
sexual activity. The messages came quickly and regularly from the sender’s
account, suggesting it was not an imposter unfamiliar with the incident, and
contained details about the encounter that would not be easily known by anyone
beyond the accused and the complainant.147
The cases described above indicate that witness testimony and circumstantial
evidence can be sufficient to establish authorship on a balance of probabilities in
relation to digital hearsay evidence. A previous history of communications
between the complainant and accused may be relevant in establishing authorship,
but a lengthy correspondence is not required. In Phagura, only two days of
messages were entered into evidence (it is unclear if this was the extent of the
accused and complainant’s correspondence), while in MacDonald the accused
and complainant only began exchanging messages after the alleged assault. A
longer messaging history may be even more useful, as it may include personal
details about the parties that indicate the accused is in fact the sender. Further,
while evidence linking an accused to the account from which the messages
originated (rather than linking an accused to the content of the messages) may be
helpful, such evidence was not always required. Thus, in order for digital
communications purportedly authored by the accused to be admitted under the
CEA and as an exception to the hearsay rule, evidence originating from the
complainant’s testimony has in many cases been sufficient. Whether or not this
evidence will be sufficient to establish authorship beyond a reasonable doubt has
been the subject of varying interpretations in the case law.

(e) Proving Authorship of Digital Evidence at the Gender-Based Violence
Trial
As noted previously, identity is an essential element of any criminal offence
and must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.148 In accordance with an
accused’s presumption of innocence, the Crown bears the burden of proving the
accused is the guilty party, and the accused is never required to prove their
innocence.149 Unlike other essential elements, identity need not be proved
through direct evidence, and circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to
146
147
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establish identity.150 Where electronic communications are relied on to establish
identity, the Crown must prove the accused authored the messages. 151 In many
cases, defence counsel will lead evidence to counter the Crown’s theory that the
accused was the author of impugned messages. While a number of the cases we
reviewed involved only witness testimony and circumstantial evidence sufficient
to prove the identity of the author of digital messages beyond a reasonable
doubt, recent appellate case law indicates additional evidence will be necessary in
some circumstances. Precisely what circumstances will require further evidence is
not entirely clear, leading to potential confusion for victims, police, lawyers, and
judges.
Witness testimony coupled with circumstantial evidence was held to be
sufficient to prove authorship beyond a reasonable doubt in a number of the
GBV cases we reviewed. This evidence was similar to that relied on to establish
threshold admissibility and in the hearsay cases discussed above and included the
accused’s name being associated with an online account,152 the timing of the
messages,153 possible motives of the accused,154 images of the accused or of
things associated with him (i.e., his children, animals, vehicles), 155 similarity in
user names between messages or with information relating to the accused, 156
personal information about the parties in the content of the messages, 157 and
similarities in the language or ways of communicating between disputed and
undisputed messages.158
While the complainant’s testimony and circumstantial evidence alone were
sufficient to establish authorship in some cases, in others the circumstantial
evidence tendered by the Crown was insufficient to establish authorship beyond
a reasonable doubt. In R. v. Himes, the accused had been convicted at trial of
child luring in relation to two 14-year-old girls.159 On appeal, the defence
successfully argued that the trial judge erred in finding identity had been proved
beyond a reasonable doubt in relation to the second complainant. The
inculpatory text messages purportedly sent to this complainant had not been
150
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placed before the court, as her phone had been stolen prior to her reporting the
incident to police. This complainant testified that she received texts from an
unknown telephone number she believed was linked to the accused, and when
neither the Crown nor defence pushed the issue of identity further, the trial judge
intervened and asked the complainant how she knew it was the accused’s
number. She responded that she had asked him his name, and he had told her. 160
The judge on appeal found this to be a leading question on a crucial issue, which
constituted a palpable and overriding error.
In R. v. Pogoryelov, there was no evidence directly linking the accused to text
messages arranging a sexual encounter with a police officer who he believed to be
a 14-year-old girl.161 The judge found that the circumstantial evidence of the
accused appearing at the specified hotel room door at the time arranged in the
text messages, carrying the agreed-upon amount of cash, and the cellphone that
sent the messages being located in a nearby car containing the accused’s I.D.,
were insufficient to establish guilt. The defence did not explicitly raise any theory
of who an alternative sender could be; however, the judge relied on the Supreme
Court of Canada’s decision in R. v. Villaroman in acquitting the accused.162 In
Villaroman, the Court clarified that when a case turns on circumstantial evidence,
judges are required to consider other plausible theories and reasonable
possibilities inconsistent with guilt, so long as these are based on logic and
experience, rather than speculation.163 The Crown may be required to negative
reasonable possibilities, but it is established law that the Crown does not need to
‘‘negative every possible conjecture, no matter how irrational or fanciful, which
might be consistent with the innocence of the accused.”164 The judge in
Pogoryelov found that the evidence as a whole left open reasonable inferences
other than guilt that were not purely speculative.165
The above outcome can be contrasted to R. v. Chheda, in which the accused
was convicted of child luring in similar circumstances, after arriving at the
agreed-upon hotel room at the prearranged time, holding two hot chocolates and
the precise amount of cash the undercover officer had asked him to bring via
text-message. While the police searched the accused’s car in the parking lot and
did not locate the phone used to send the text messages to the undercover officer,
they did locate another cell phone in that car. Representatives from Rogers and
Freedom Mobile gave testimony regarding the records of the two phones, which
demonstrated they travelled to the same locations on the relevant date. This,
160
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combined with the circumstantial evidence of the accused arriving at the
prearranged location carrying specific items, was found to prove the accused was
the sender of the text messages.166 Thus, additional forensic evidence regarding
the location or account details of a communications device may be necessary to
prove identity beyond a reasonable doubt in some cases.
In four cases we reviewed, defence counsel raised the possibility that a third
party may have written messages incriminating the accused. In R. v. Harris,
forensic evidence from the accused’s hard drive, as well as circumstantial
evidence, was relied on to prove that sexual Facebook messages to an underage
complainant who was a personal acquaintance of the accused originated from his
account.167 The judge noted that it defied logic and common sense that another
individual would use the accused’s account to set up a sexual encounter with the
complainant, as the plan would fall apart when she attended the meeting and did
not recognize the author.168 In R. v. M.R., defence counsel put forward a theory
that an anonymous hacker may have authored an email containing the
complainant’s intimate images, a theory which the judge found to be ‘‘devoid
of any realistic foundation.”169 The judge found the circumstantial evidence left
him with no reasonable doubt that the accused distributed the photos, as the
accused was the only person to whom complainant had sent the images, he had
access to her Facebook account, and the emails were sent to people close to the
complainant rather than random individuals or all of the complainant’s
contacts.170
In R. v. Proctor, the defence argued that unknown clients of the complainant,
who worked as an escort, could have made harassing phone calls and authored
anonymous harassing text messages.171 In rejecting those arguments, the judge
noted the accused’s consistent use of the term ‘‘goof” in his messages to the
166
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complainant and in fake profiles used to harass the complainant, 172 as well as
consistent spelling errors, expressions, and themes in the messages, to determine
the accused authored all of the relevant messages.173 Finally, in R. v. Careen, the
defence argued that another person or persons could have authored
incriminating text messages allegedly sent by the accused teacher to one of his
female students, as the accused’s phone was frequently left sitting out in the
accused’s home and borrowed by other individuals at his workplace. The judge
noted the proximity in timing between the messages the accused admitted
authoring and those he contested,174 and he identified the accused’s consistent
use of exclamation points and the phrase ‘‘ha ha” between contested and
uncontested messages, which he understood to indicate the accused was the
author of the messages.175 The judge found the inference that someone would
take control of the accused’s phone at multiple points in time to impersonate his
‘‘very distinctive style of text communication” was implausible and lacked a
conceivable rational motive.176
In five cases we examined, defence counsel raised the possibility that the
complainant herself may have authored the incriminating messages in order to
frame the accused. In R. v. G.B., the defence argued that the complainant had
forged text messages and images of injuries following an alleged sexual assault,
but the trial judge did not accept these arguments on the basis there ‘‘were and
still are too many ways and means to expose such a hoax for that contention to
be credible.”177 In R. v. Lauck, the defence raised the possibility the complainant
may have authored the numerous harassing pseudonymous Facebook messages
she received in order to make the accused look bad in a custody dispute over
their daughter.178 Following inconsistent evidence from the accused about his
knowledge of and access to digital accounts, and after examining the content of
the messages, the judge framed the relevant question not as whether it was
possible that someone else sent the impugned messages, but how likely it was that
someone else did.179 The judge did not find it likely that the complainant would
use pseudonymous accounts if she wanted to frame the accused, nor would she
call herself sexist and degrading names in group chats with mutual
acquaintances.180 Circumstantial evidence including consistency in contents of
172
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the messages with the way the accused spoke, such as the use of particular words
and phrases, led the judge to conclude that the only rational inference to be
drawn from the evidence was that the accused authored the messages.181
In R. v. Owens, the defence relied on the complainant’s expertise in
computers and apparent motivation of obtaining leverage to get the house in
separation proceedings from the accused in support of a theory that the
complainant manufactured harassing emails she received.182 The trial judge
rejected the defence theory that it was the complainant who wrote these emails,
noting a ‘‘striking similarity” between an email the accused admitted having sent
and the four contested emails was the ‘‘unusual use of capital letters,” as well as
the theme of forgiveness in two of the emails.183 The judge found this similarity
suggested either that the defendant wrote all of the emails or ‘‘that the
complainant was careful to replicate a theme and grammatical style associated
with the defendant in an email sent by him months earlier.” 184 The judge found
the contents of the emails too subtle, noting that if the complainant had
fabricated them to frame the accused, they would have been more explicitly
harassing.185 As in Lauck, the judge found the complainant would logically have
sent the messages under the accused’s name if she were attempting to frame
him.186 Further, in this case there was additional evidence of the emails being
sent from IP addresses associated with physical addresses linked to the
accused.187
While many judges rejected claims the complainant fabricated abusive
messages as far-fetched or speculative, these claims were successful in
contributing to a reasonable doubt in at least one decision. In R. v. S.S.,188 a
case involving allegations of extortion and the non-consensual disclosure of
intimate images, there was a wealth of digital evidence before the court, including
over 550 pages of online communications ostensibly between the accused and
complainant. The defence submitted that in some of the online exchanges the
complainant may have authored the accused’s side of their conversations by
logging into his account, asserting that she had done this to a former boyfriend in
the past.189 Defence counsel further claimed that the complainant or someone
acting on her direction likely posted her intimate images online.190 While the
judge concluded that the accused authored most of the electronic conversations
181
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tendered as evidence, he found it ‘‘plausible” that the complainant was talking to
herself at some points.191 The judge relied on certain characteristics of digital
platforms for this finding, noting that the display name of a Skype account can
be easily changed at any time and was ‘‘in no way dispositive” of the question of
whether that message originated from a particular account, 192 that it would have
been simple for the complainant to gain access to the accused’s Skype account, 193
and that Facebook does not take steps to ensure account holders are who they
say they are.194
In contrast to Lauck and Owens, the judge in SS rejected arguments that
similarities in language and spelling errors between contested and non-contested
messages, as well as references to personal information about the accused within
those messages, established that they were written by the accused. The judge
found that someone attempting to disguise themselves as the accused could have
included these references ‘‘in an effort to add credibility to a deception,” and that
the complainant would have had this knowledge of the accused given their past
intimate relationship.195 The judge ultimately found that neither the accused nor
complainant were credible witnesses, and that the integrity of the electronic
evidence was ‘‘at the very low end of the spectrum,” such that he was left with a
reasonable doubt about what actually occurred.196
Finally, in Aslami, defence counsel at trial had raised the theory that the
accused’s ex-wife and a man he considered an enemy might have authored
incriminating messages in order to frame him.197 In that case, the accused’s expartner had a sexual encounter with the accused’s so-called enemy and sent the
accused an image of the two of them in bed together. A few hours after that
image was sent, the home of the enemy’s ex-wife, where she and their three
children resided, was set on fire. At trial, the Crown relied on SMS text messages,
messages sent through an application called TextNow, 198 and Facebook
messages implicating the author in the fire-bombing, arguing these messages
had been authored by the accused.
The trial judge detailed reasons for finding the accused had authored the
electronic messages, highlighting evidence he found did not depend on the
testimony of the complainants and noting the animus between the parties and the
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defence theory of possible fabrication.199 The judge found the content and timing
of the messages aligned with the accused’s activities at the relevant time, as
confirmed by independent evidence.200 The judge also found that consistency in
‘‘content, specific terms, tone, grammar and spelling” between the messages sent
across the various platforms indicated the accused had authored all of them. 201
The Ontario Court of Appeal found that the trial judge in Aslami committed
a serious error in failing to ‘‘recognize the inherent fallibility” of the digital
evidence.202 At paragraph 11, Nordheimer JA stated:
This case demonstrates the risks associated with not paying adequate
heed to the dangers that are associated with relying on text and other
messages, absent expert evidence explaining how various pieces of
software, or ‘‘apps,” can be used to generate these messages, and how
reliable the resulting messages are in different respects. Put simply, it is
too easy to use various pieces of software to create, or manipulate,
messages such that they can appear to be from someone when, in fact,
they emanate from an entirely different person. Similarly, the timing of
the messages can be altered to suit a particular purpose.

The Court noted the lack of any evidence directly linking the messages to the
accused. While accepting that the trial judge could reasonably have concluded
that text messages describing the accused’s whereabouts were authored by
him,203 the most incriminating messages were sent via the TextNow application,
which the Court found to be unreliable. The screenshots tendered by the Crown
did not show the exact time each message was sent or received, and no expert
evidence was led regarding the functionality or fallibilities of TextNow. 204
Further, nothing in the content of the TextNow messages established the accused
as the sender.205 While the trial judge had found that particular phrases and
spelling errors including ‘‘Karama is a bitch,” ‘‘my worst enemie,” ‘‘u won” or ‘‘u
win,” ‘‘Woow,” misspelling ‘‘else” as ‘‘elese,” and misspelling ‘‘house” as ‘‘hous”
on multiple occasions indicated the accused authored all the messages, 206 the
Court of Appeal criticized the trial judge’s reliance on style and tone as a ‘‘flawed
and unreliable foundation” for that conclusion.207 The Court noted that
grammar and spelling are not unique to an individual person, text messages often
use unusual expressions, and spelling errors are common in relation to text
199
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messages.208 The Court found that it was unclear ‘‘what the trial judge meant by,
or how he could extract, the ‘tone’ of the text messages,” or how such tone would
be unique to the appellant.209 The Court further found that determining that the
substantive content indicated the appellant was the author engaged in
‘‘somewhat circular reasoning,” as it assumed that because the sender knew
about the firebombing, it must be the accused who sent the messages. 210 Finally,
the Court found the Facebook messages had no evidentiary value, as there was
no evidence tying them to the accused other than the recipient’s belief they
originated from him.211 The Court warned that trial judges must be cautious in
their evaluation of electronic evidence and noted that the prosecution ought to
have called expert evidence to address the issues posed by the evidence. 212
The Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in Aslami appears to indicate that
expert evidence relating to the functionality and reliability of messaging software
and applications will be necessary in some cases where authorship is contested. 213
This, along with the Court’s rejection of reliance on similarities in style and tone
of contested messages as indicative of authorship, appears to be something of a
departure from the previous case law on authorship of digital
communications.214 Judges are being asked to strike a difficult balance
between accepting the reality that digital communications can be fabricated
with relative ease, while not allowing entirely speculative and far-fetched claims
regarding alternative authorship to raise a reasonable doubt in every case
involving digital evidence. In the final section of this paper, we outline our
recommendations for police, Crown, and judges to ensure that accuseds’ right to
a fair trial is protected without creating an impossible burden for the Crown and
re-traumatizing victims of GBV when authorship is disputed.

(f) Recommendations
The cases examined above indicate that the criminal justice system is in a
state of flux regarding the handling of electronic evidence in cases where the
authorship of that evidence is contested. This state of uncertainty may cause
difficulties for complainants in cases of GBV. Complainants have historically
been disbelieved and have borne the brunt of providing evidence, where scant
208
209
210
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evidence may exist, on which the person who harmed them can be found guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. In this concluding section we briefly outline some
recommendations stemming from our examination of the existing case law that
may assist victims of GBV, police, and the Crown in providing the courts with
sufficient evidence to prove authorship in cases involving crucial digital evidence.
When receiving a complaint of GBV, police must consider whether relevant
digital evidence may be available and work quickly to ensure that evidence is
located, extracted, and preserved in a timely manner. In order to do this, police
must familiarize themselves with various social media and messaging platforms
and make timely requests to intermediaries such as cell phone companies,
Internet Service Providers, and in some cases social media or software companies
to gather relevant information about the source, timing, or location of these
communications.215 When possible, police should consider collecting the
metadata associated with this evidence.216 While metadata was not always
necessary to establish authorship in the GBV cases we reviewed, it can assist
police, the Crown, and the court in identifying the date, author, recipient, and
other relevant details related to the case.217
Given the nature of police investigations involving GBV complaints, the
majority of digital communications evidence will likely come from complainants’
devices. Police should do everything in their power to ensure that this
information is extracted quickly, and GBV complainants are not deprived of
their digital communications devices for extended periods of time, as
complainants will often rely on these devices for their social connections,
livelihoods, or ability to access help or support in the wake of a traumatizing
violent incident.218 Wherever possible, police should consider the possibility of
extracting this digital evidence elsewhere by obtaining a warrant to search the
accused’s devices,219 seizing an accused’s devices in cases of allegations of nonconsensual distribution, voyeurism, or child pornography,220 or using their
215

216

217

218

See e.g. Donaldson, supra note 78 at 5; SS, supra note 62 at paras 104-05, 112; Aslami
2021, supra note 79 at para 20.
Susan Wortzman & Susan Nickle, “Obtaining Relevant Electronic Evidence” (2009)
36:2 Adv Q 226.
Gordon Scott Campbell, ‘‘What Test will be Applied by the Courts with Respect to the
Production of Metadata Related to Digital Images” (1 June 2019) Carswell CARS1MEMO:ONM 9274.
In a case not cited elsewhere in this paper (R. v. C.R.D., 2019 PESC 30, 2019 CarswellPEI
56 (P.E.I. S.C.)), the judge critiqued the police for not seizing the complainant’s phone to
recover relevant digital evidence. This was not done in part because the complainant did
not want to part with her phone for the ‘‘couple of weeks to a month” she understood she
would need to, and the judge noted that while the complainant claimed she could not do
without her phone during that time for school and family reasons, the police ‘‘did not
pursue that option with any vigour” (at paras 10, 36). See also Nancy E Glass et al, ‘‘The
Longitudinal Impact of an Internet Safety Decision Aid for Abused Women” (2017) 52:5
Am J Preventative Medicine 606; Chuka Emezue, ‘‘Digital or Digitally Delivered
Responses to Domestic and Intimate Partner Violence During COVID-19” (2020) 6:13
JMIR Public Health Surveillance 1.

ON THE INTERNET, NOBODY KNOWS YOU ARE A DOG

403

power under the Criminal Code to obtain a preservation or production order
from an individual or company likely to possess relevant data.221 The accused
may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their electronic communications
even if these are seized from the device of the recipient, something the police must
take into account when conducting searches of electronic devices. 222 Whether a
reasonable expectation of privacy exists will turn on a case-specific assessment of
the totality of the circumstances,223 and thus section 8 Charter considerations
must always be kept in mind by investigating officers.
Finally, officers involved in the extraction of relevant digital evidence should
be prepared to testify about how this evidence was located and extracted, and
about the functionality of the relevant application or platform from which it was
obtained. Once again, having familiarity with a wide variety of digital messaging
platforms will be necessary in this regard. Officers understanding what these
platforms are and how they function will assist in ensuring relevant digital
evidence is extracted quickly, properly, and comprehensively, and may limit the
necessity of requiring expert evidence at trial, as discussed further below.
Alternatively, forensic experts may be used to carry out these searches and be
similarly prepared to testify on these issues.
Assuming police have undertaken a comprehensive investigation and located
all relevant digital evidence, it is up to Crown counsel to ensure this evidence is
presented in a way that establishes as far as possible that the accused authored
these messages. Crown counsel should put together as complete a record as
possible of communications between the complainant and the account or number
associated with the contested messages, as a history of communications between
the complainant and that account or number was found to be relevant to
establishing authorship in a number of cases.224 The time and dates stamps of the
communications should be included, as well as evidence confirming that the time
records on the device accurately represented the time.225
Crown counsel should familiarize themselves with the admissibility
requirements under the CEA and ensure that all electronic evidence, including
relevant digital communications, is properly admitted pursuant to those
provisions.226 Crown counsel must ensure that the complainant is properly
219
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prepared to answer questions about the source and timing of any contested
communications, as well as how and why they believe the communications
originated from the accused. A failure to do this in Himes resulted in the trial
judge intervening to ask how the complainant knew the messages originated
from the accused, resulting in an acquittal being entered on appeal. 227 Crown
counsel must also prepare complainants to answer basic questions regarding the
functionality of their devices and accounts from which the digital evidence was
extracted. Complainants are unlikely to be familiar with the evidentiary rules
behind digital evidence and would benefit from preparation either by the Crown
or from outside legal advice. Several provinces, including Ontario, Nova Scotia,
and Newfoundland, have introduced state-funded legal representation for sexual
assault complainants.228 Lawyers in these roles have the opportunity to explain
the role that digital evidence may play in the trial process and assist complainants
in preparing to testify about digital evidence. Frontline victim service
organizations would also benefit from funding and training that could help
them explain the role of the complainant in presenting digital evidence at trial. 229
However, not all complainants will have access to these services, and Crown
counsel must remain vigilant in their role when preparing witnesses for what to
expect at trial.
Circumstantial evidence has been sufficient to prove authorship in a number
of cases, and Crown counsel must carefully compile and present such evidence in
a way that supports an inference that the accused authored the relevant evidence.
When attempting to establish authorship in relation to hearsay, or for the
purpose of establishing identity at trial, the Crown should call witnesses who
were involved in the creation of the electronic evidence, such as the person who
took the screenshot. This was not done in two cases we examined. In one of these
cases, the judge noted that calling such a witness would have been preferable, 230
and the accused was acquitted in the other.231 This process of establishing
226
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authorship could also include taking statements from witnesses who received or
took screenshots of the digital evidence, searching the device from which the
original post was made, or obtaining information from a social media website to
address issues of authorship.
Whatever the comprehensiveness of the police investigation and preparation
of Crown counsel, how digital evidence is interpreted and what conclusions are
drawn from it are within the control of the judge and trier of fact. In terms of
admissibility, the current state of the law indicates that judges are safer to err on
the side of admitting electronic evidence pursuant to the CEA, even where
questions of authorship are contested or unresolved.232 Judges must ensure they
are familiar with the CEA provisions so that their admission and consideration
of digital evidence is not left vulnerable to appeal.233 That being said, the
extremely low bar for threshold admissibility under the CEA has raised concerns
for trial fairness by some commentators.234 We agree with Silver that judges
should consider using their gatekeeper function to exclude electronic evidence
that may be unfairly prejudicial.
Crucially, judges should familiarize themselves with the functionality of
common digital communications technologies. David Paciocco noted in 2013
that many judges consider information technology to be mysterious, but that fear
of this technology, and concern about potential manipulation, cannot result in
the rejection of the use of electronic documents and emails at trial. 235 The
Canadian Judicial Council released a substantially revised Ethical Principles for
Judges in June 2021. These principles state that judges ‘‘should develop and
maintain proficiency with technology relevant to the nature and performance of
their judicial duties.”236 We agree with Amy Salyzyn that this obligation should
be read as including competence in relation to commonly used technologies that
may produce evidence tendered in court.237 While judges cannot be expected to
keep up to date with every available digital messaging service, social media
platform, or communications application, some awareness of the workings of
widely-used technologies and the general operations of these platforms should be
required.
Judicial familiarity with digital communications technologies will help ensure
that trials where authorship of digital evidence is contested proceed in an
expedient and fair manner. While testimony explaining the operation of certain
232
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electronic devices, applications, or platforms will often be necessary, we believe
that expert evidence regarding the functionality of these devices, applications, or
platforms should only be required in cases dealing with disputes regarding
particularly complex or uncommon technologies or investigatory techniques, or
in cases where there is evidence to suggest the digital evidence has been
manipulated. While it was not explicitly stated in the decision, we understand the
Ontario Court of Appeal’s finding in Aslami to suggest that expert evidence
should be called to explain how messaging software operates in the context of the
lesser-known application TextNow. This suggests that expert evidence may be
required to explain apps that might not be familiar to the courts, or may more
easily be used to misrepresent data. We do not understand this to be a finding
that expert evidence will always be necessary in cases involving digital messages
where authorship is contested. Expert testimony lengthens the trial process and
adds pressure for additional resources from the parties involved and from the
courts.238
For means of electronic communications that are commonplace and widelyused, such as SMS text messaging, iMessaging, Facebook, Twitter, Gmail, etc.,
judges should ideally be able to take judicial notice of certain aspects of their
functionality.239 Judicial notice allows judges to accept the existence of a
proposition when no reasonable person could dispute the proposition being
asserted.240 In R. v. Swierkot, for example, the judge took judicial notice of the
functionality of iMessages on the basis that ‘‘iPhones have long been among the
most commonly used mobile devices on the planet, and that the messaging
application is used dozens of times daily by millions of users,” 241 and in MR the
judge noted that ‘‘[a]lmost any sentient person in our society knows in a general
sense, that page rank returns on Google are generated by a complicated revenuedriving enterprise, combined with a propriety algorithmic ranking of the interest
associated with a particular website.”242
In the cases we reviewed, everything from the complainant’s sole
testimony, 243 to non-expert testimony from investigating officers, 244 to
evidence from a qualified expert245 was relied on to establish authenticity and/
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or identity. For technologies that are not commonplace, or with regard to aspects
of their operation that are not notorious or capable of immediate and accurate
demonstration,246 lay ‘‘fact” witnesses with expertise or experience using the
technology or platform should provide factual evidence about its operation
without requiring qualification as an expert.247 As noted in R. v. Durigon, where
the evidence ‘‘concerns facts related to the operation of technology, the evidence
is properly regarded as simply factual technical information, ultimately
incontrovertible, and not open to debate.”248 Paciocco classifies ‘‘mundane
technologies” as ‘‘the day-to-day uses to which information technology is put,”
and he includes the use of social media and the operation of search engines,
computers, tablets, smart phones, applications, and digital recording
technologies within this category.249 In cases where courts require help in
understanding these mundane technologies, lay witnesses can be called to
describe their functionality.250 Where there is a debate between the parties as to
how the technology operates, where there are legitimate concerns over the
manipulation of evidence through technology, or where evidence is required to
explain a more technical aspect of the technology’s operation, expert opinion
may be required.251
Our final recommendation relates to the standard that judges should apply in
assessing defence theories of fabrication in cases where the evidence is wholly or
primarily circumstantial. An accused’s right to make full answer and defence
entitles them to challenge the Crown’s case and lead evidence raising a
reasonable doubt as to whether the accused committed the offence. 252 While
all relevant evidence put forward by the defence must not be excluded unless its
prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value, 253 in order for a
judge to put a defence to a jury, the accused ‘‘must point to evidence on the
245
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record that gives the defence an air of reality.”254 Further, when assessing
circumstantial evidence, inferences consistent with innocence do not have to arise
from proven facts.255 Rather, in assessing circumstantial evidence, what matters
is the range of reasonable inferences that can be drawn from this evidence. 256
As noted above, the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Villaroman
clarifies that the Crown is required to respond to, and judges are required to
consider, plausible alternative theories other than guilt.257 The Court in that
decision noted that the line between a plausible alternative theory and
speculation is not always easy to draw.258 A theory alternative to guilt will not
be speculative simply because it arises from a lack of evidence, rather than
evidence on the record; however, it must ‘‘be based on logic and experience
applied to the evidence or absence of evidence, not on speculation.”259
In our view, the assessment of whether viewed logically and in light of human
experience the evidence is reasonably capable of supporting an inference other
than guilt must include some consideration of the reasonable likelihood of a
theory involving fabrication or an alternative sender.260 Alternative inferences
must be reasonable, not just possible.261 In the cases we examined, judges
generally dismissed as far-fetched or unrealistic theories that a third party sender
authored the incriminating messages,262 or that the complainant authored them
herself.263 While there will certainly be circumstances in which the possibility of
fabrication should be taken seriously and be sufficient to raise a reasonable
doubt as to guilt, we argue that there must be some evidence to support the
assertion that this could be the case to meet the standard of a plausible
alternative theory. While the Court of Appeal ordering a new trial in Aslami may
have been the only outcome consistent with the accused’s right to be presumed
innocent, we also note that the Court overturned the trial judge’s decision based
on a lack of direct evidence establishing the accused as the author of the messages
while rejecting types of circumstantial evidence that have assisted in proving
authorship in previous cases.264 The Court also did not engage deeply with the
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plausibility of the defence theory that the complainants could have authored the
messages themselves. For example, as noted by the trial judge, any plan to frame
the accused involving the man who was his enemy would have required his socalled enemy to be complicit in fire-bombing a house where his own children
lived.265

CONCLUSION
Cases of GBV, including sexual assault and intimate partner violence, are
uniquely challenging for all criminal justice system actors and participants. In
addition to the historical biases, myths, and stereotypes that continue to
contribute to GBV victims being disbelieved, having their behaviours unfairly
scrutinized, and having their cases insufficiently investigated, the increase in
digital evidence in these cases has created new challenges for police, the Crown,
and judges. Authorship of digital evidence can be difficult to prove given its fluid,
interconnected, and dynamic nature, and questions of who authored relevant
digital evidence may be frequently raised and difficult to resolve.
In order to ensure GBV trials proceed fairly, and that complainants do not
have their claims dismissed or credibility undermined based on speculative claims
regarding contested authorship, justice system participants must ensure they take
requirements regarding electronic documents seriously. Victims of gender-based
violence are often reluctant to report the crimes against them because of the
systemic barriers they have faced and continue to face that make the costs of
participating in the justice system outweigh the benefits. Without sufficient
investigations and adequate trial strategies involving GBV and digital evidence,
victims are at risk of being re-traumatized by the justice system process.
Additionally, inadequate investigations may result in trial unfairness for the
complainant. Police must ensure the timely and accurate collection of electronic
evidence, ideally including evidence indicating the author of digital messages.
Crown counsel bear the responsibility of proving identity beyond a reasonable
doubt and must ensure any digital evidence supportive of identity is properly
admitted and fully explored through direct and cross-examination of witnesses,
including expert witnesses where challenges to the veracity of this evidence are
likely. Judges must ensure that they familiarize themselves with the evolving law
in this area and keep up to date with communications technologies that are in
general use, and they must not unduly exclude or give little weight to digital
evidence based on the mere possibility of fabrication. The criminal justice system
is adjusting to the new reality of digital evidence, and actors within that system
must do their best to ensure trial fairness for victims of GBV.
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